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t was in Tunisia that events sparked what became known as the Arab Spring, and until 
now Tunisia has also been viewed as a likely ‘success story’ within the post-revolt Arab 
world. Since ousting its dictator Ben Ali over two years ago, however, disagreements 
within the country have run deep; divisions have proved to be complex and multifaceted 
and the fragile stability has barely been sustainable. In the absence of a common vision for 
the country, the status quo was shaken yet again by the assassination of opposition leader 
Chokri Belaid of the Democratic Patriots’ Movement. The replacement of Prime Minister 
Hamadi Jebali by the former head of the Ministry of Interior, Ali Laarayedh, after the 
f o r m e r ’ s  f a i l u r e  t o  f o r m  a  t e c h n o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  t h e  w a k e  o f  t h e  m u r d e r  h a s  
undermined the chances of a quick resolution of the political crisis. Moreover, Standard & 
Poor’s recent downgrading of Tunisia’s sovereign credit rating throws another obstacle in 
the way of economic recovery. This commentary addresses two interrelated questions: How 
might Tunisia’s political and economic crisis evolve and what possible role is there for the 
EU?  
A divided society 
The assassination of the opposition leader exposed the underlying divisions between 
members of the ruling classes, between those in and outside of government, between 
religious groupings and secularists, and between the coastal areas and the hinterland of 
Tunisia. Since the revolution, tackling social inclusion has become a pressing problem: men 
versus women, young versus old, opponents versus supporters of the old regime and 
political forces inside Tunisia versus those in exile. The National Constituent Assembly 
(NCA)’s inability to address these fault lines and approve the second draft of the constitution 
has hampered the transition of the country towards the next elections, while all of the above 
have undermined trust in the political process.  
Fragmented government 
On the level of the ruling troika coalition, there was no consensus on former Prime Minister 
Hamadi Jebali’s proposal for technocratic government to run the country until fresh elections 
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are held later this year. One of the ruling party Ennahda’s secularist junior partners, 
Ettakatol, supports an apolitical solution to the current turmoil. However, the Congress for 
the Republic Party (CPR) has opposed such an outcome, warning of the return of figures 
from the Ben Ali regime. Even if Ennahda succeeds in forming a national unity government 
as an alternative to a technocratic one, further top-level reshuffling will likely prove 
necessary to accommodate divergent views.  
Jebali’s call for the dissolution of government did not only bring about strategic interactions 
within the troika but within the ruling party as well. His more moderate views were not 
shared by a number of hardliners in his Ennahda party, signalling a stalemate within the 
coalition itself.  
Opposition united? 
Looking outside the government, Ennahda is being challenged by a vibrant and ever more 
organised opposition represented by the newly formed secularist coalition ‘Alliance for 
Tunisia’, which combines remnants from Ben Ali’s regime and break-outs from other parties. 
However, the opposition’s large alliances are far from forming a single-minded political 
entity and ideological differences have not been overcome. While support for Ennahda’s 
economic policies has started to wane, the former Prime Minister Beji Caid el Sebsi managed 
to quickly increase Nidaa Tounes’ (‘Call for Tunisia’) popularity and to agree a common 
campaign slogan with four opposition parties. Moreover, the standing of the other 
opposition coalition of parties, the Popular Front, has significantly improved since the 
assassination of one of its leaders and its cunning positioning against both the moderate 
Islamists and the ‘anti-Islamists’. In sum, the opposition alliance has thus far successfully 
managed to keep the balance among twelve parties, mostly leaning to the left. The move 
towards more structure in the lines of the opposition is a clear sign that it is trying to set an 
alternative political agenda to that of Ennahda, thus addressing one of the major setbacks of 
previous elections.  
Civic activism at play 
Anti-government strikes and rallies have not been reserved for the opposing political parties 
but also for the main trade union, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), which was 
perceived as not being able to challenge Ben Ali’s regime in any way. The Union has become 
increasingly vocal by calling general strikes and taking to the streets of the capital and other 
cities to express the disillusionment of workers at the deteriorating economic climate and 
economic inequality between the coastal and interior regions. The UGTT not only has a large 
support base but also very valid concerns about slowing economic development. The latter 
has hit young Tunisians hardest. On the one hand, in the face of unemployment that has 
doubled since the start of the revolution, young people are becoming more politically active 
and ready to challenge the government. On the other hand, some young Tunisians are being 
targeted for recruitment by different radical Islamists and Salafist militias, ranging from 
small movements of non-violent Salafists, parties, and scholars, to jihadists taught to fight in 
Syria, Mali and Algeria, often financed by richer Arab governments. 
The analysis leads us to identify three scenarios in Tunisia:  
a)  Popular mobilisation turned into violence and then into chaos: in the medium term, the 
mobilisation of different grievances leads to more violence, which gives the regime an 
excuse for repression. The Tunisian ruling elite restricts popular protests and limits 
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b)  Response to deteriorating economic performance and instability: trade unions and 
business representatives are pushing for a faster transition and the improvement of the 
economic and political situation. However, a worsening economic climate, the decline in 
the attractiveness of Tunisia as a tourist destination and greater regional disparities are 
driving a wedge between the regime and the economic elite.  
c)  Costly repression, institutional compromise and greater stability: sidelining social 
inclusion issues and repressing mobilisation becomes too costly for the ruling elite, which 
will have to seek compromise to achieve stability in the longer term. 
The role of the EU 
Whichever scenario holds ground, the EU can play a more active role in assisting Tunisia in 
this post-uprising period. Declarations of support, such as Catherine Ashton’s expression of 
respect for Jebali’s decision to resign and her call for the adoption of a new constitution and 
the organisation of elections through all-inclusive dialogue are essential to building 
confidence in EU-Tunisia relations.  
The “EU's response to the ‘Arab Spring’: The State-of-Play after Two Years”1 reaffirms that 
EU-Tunisia relations are based on three interrelated ‘Ms’: money, market and mobility. With 
respect to the first aspect, overall EU financial and technical support for Tunisia has almost 
doubled to €390 million over the period 2011-2012 on the strength of the political and socio-
economic reforms engaged in by the Tunisian government. One hundred million euro was 
channelled through the SPRING programme in support of governance reforms and inclusive 
economic growth, notably targeting the reform of the justice sector, capacity-building of civil 
society, support for the renovation of popular neighbourhoods and support for the 
implementation of the association agreement and for democratic transition. Support 
programmed under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 
2012 focused on economic recovery (€68 million) as well as health and the fight against 
inequalities (€12 million). Contributions from the EU are complemented with member states’ 
contributions. 
In terms of market access, preparations are underway for three key agreements: a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), an agreement on the liberalisation of the 
air transport sector and for an agreement on Acceptance and Conformity Assessment for 
industrial products. However, as the experience of the eastern partners demonstrates, 
negotiations and ratification of agreements such as the DCFTA are not expected to take less 
than five years. The effect of support from the EU to Tunisia through the market channel is 
lessened, also because of the slow pace of economic recovery of the country’s main trading 
partners: Italy, France, Spain and the EU in general. Currently, the pursuit of deeper trade 
relations with the EU is the most natural path for Tunisia’s recovery, given that in 2011 
Tunisia exported €9,257.1 million (74.2% of total exports) and imported €12,387.7 million 
(63.1% of total imports). Other trade partners such as Libya (4.8% of total trade), China (3.3% 
of total trade), Russia (2.9%), Algeria and Turkey (both at 2.6%) contribute much less to the 
Tunisian economy.   
Mobility is yet another area where Tunisians have much to gain but where discussions are in 
stalemate. Up until now some member states have insisted that the Tunisian government 
implements numerous changes, particularly in the area of legislation vis-à-vis readmission of 
third country nationals. Mobility is also problematic due to its interrelatedness with justice, 
security and defence issues. With the increasing violence in many other North African 
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countries, the EU is not expected to take quick steps towards easing the entry to the EU of 
Tunisian residents and those in transit.  
Conclusion 
While the Tunisian government, opposition and people trade accusations about who stole 
the revolution, the political and economic crises remain unsolved. Even though transitions 
are usually messy, hopeful Tunisians, eager for a functioning economy and political 
freedoms, were caught off-guard by the assassination of Belaid and the fall of the 
government. Although Tunisians are primarily responsible for the political processes in their 
country, in order to help set the country off on the right reform track the EU should step up 
its efforts to alleviate the hardships by implementing the three 'Ms', to which it has 
committed. 